










The Price of Liquidity: 









CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2576 
CATEGORY 7: MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
MARCH 2009 
 
PRESENTED AT CESIFO AREA CONFERENCE ON MACRO, MONEY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 2009 
 
 
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 
• from the CESifo website:            Twww.CESifo-group.org/wpT CESifo Working Paper No. 2576 
 
 
The Price of Liquidity: 




We study differences in the price paid for liquidity across banks using price data at the 
individual bank level. Unique to this paper, we also have data on individual banks’ reserve 
requirements and actual reserve holdings, thus allowing us to gauge the extent to which a 
bank is short or long liquidity. We find that the price a bank pays for liquidity depends on the 
liquidity positions of other banks, as well as its own. There is evidence that liquidity squeezes 
occasionally occur and short banks pay more the larger is the potential for a squeeze. The 
price paid for liquidity is decreasing in bank size and small banks are more adversely affected 
by an increased potential for a squeeze. Contrary to what one might expect, banks in formal 
liquidity networks do not pay less. 
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A well functioning market for liquidity is essential for the eﬃciency of the broader ﬁnan-
cial markets. It is used by central banks to control short term rates and it underpins
the business of banking. It is also linked directly to securities markets through the role of
securities as collateral in a variety of operations and transactions. An illustration is oﬀered
by the ongoing credit-crunch, or so-called “sub-prime crisis”, where the entire global bank-
ing and ﬁnancial system seems to have been put at risk as liquidity has been drying up.1
Many banks have already been bailed out and, since the summer of 2007, central banks
around the world have stepped in with in with extraordinary and emergency injections of
liquidity to help stabilize markets. Despite its importance, relatively little is known about
the market for liquidity, especially at a disaggregated level. This paper sheds light on the
workings of this market by studying the price individual banks pay for liquidity and how
this varies with bank characteristics and market conditions. An important ﬁnding is that
the price a bank pays for liquidity is aﬀected by the liquidity position of other banks, as
well as its own. This is especially signiﬁcant since our sample period is taken from a time
of relative normalcy, well before the onset of the current crisis.
As for most other goods and assets, the market for liquidity consists of primary and
secondary markets. In this paper, we study primary market prices. In particular, we study
the prices, or rates, German banks pay for liquidity in the European Central Banks’ main
reﬁnancing operations, which are the main source of liquidity in the euro area. During
the sample period, June 2000 to December 2001, the average operation injected 84 billion
euros of two-week money, against collateral. Over the crisis period, other central banks
such as the Fed and the Bank of England have introduced similar operations to allow
banks to obtain liquidity against an expanded set of collateral. The ECB operations are
organized as discriminatory auctions (pay your bid), which means that diﬀerent banks end
up paying diﬀerent prices, as a function of their bids. Because we have all bids made by
each bank over time, we can also study banks’ willingness to pay. Thus, since each auction
1As testiﬁed by the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry M. Paulson Jr., and the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, Ben Bernanke, before the US House Financial Services Committee, September 24, 2008.
1provides us with a set of bids and prices at one point in time, these auctions constitute a
perfect setting for studying the willingness to pay and the actual price paid for liquidity
by diﬀerent banks.
Our analysis is concerned with potential imperfections in the market for liquidity. The
ﬁrst hypothesis we examine is that liquidity squeezes occur from time to time and, as
a consequence, the shorter banks are relative to their liquidity needs, the more they are
willing to pay for liquidity, and the more they end up paying [as suggested by Nyborg,
Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002)]. While there have been previous studies using bidder
level data from ECB operations [Nyborg et al (2002), Linzert, Nautz, and Bindseil (2007),
Craig and Fecht (2007)],2 none of these are able to directly test this hypothesis because they
lack data on banks’ liquidity positions. Unique to this paper, we have data on individual
banks’ reserve positions relative to what they are required to hold with the central bank.
We use this to construct a measure of imbalance in the market. This is motivated by
the theoretical work of Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) who show that an increase in the
positional spread between longs and shorts gives rise to more aggressive bidding in the
auction, since it increases the costs and beneﬁts from a squeeze in the interbank market
to shorts and longs, respectively. The data conﬁrms that an increase in imbalance leads
to more aggressive bidding and higher prices paid for liquidity.3 We also ﬁnd that the
premium paid per unit that a bank is short is larger when the imbalance is larger. These
ﬁndings are consistent with the view that squeezes occur in the market for liquidity and
that consequently there is a cost associated with relying on the markets to cover liquidity
needs.
Our results relate to the literature on banking and liquidity spawned by Bryant (1980)
and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and in particular on papers studying the functioning of
the interbank market [e.g. Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), Donaldson (1992), Bhattacharya
2Breitung and Nautz (2001) study ECB ﬁxed rate tenders, which were run until June 2000. In these op-
erations, bidding banks submit quantity bids, with the rate being pre-announced by the ECB. Hartmann,
Manna, and Manzanares (2001) provide an overview of euro money markets.
3This also bears relation to Furﬁne’s (2000) ﬁnding that there is a link between interbank payment
ﬂows and the federal funds rate.
2and Fulghieri (1994), Allen and Gale (2000), and Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000)].4
Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) argue that aggregate liquidity shortfalls can occur as a
result of banks free-riding on each other in providing liquidity to the interbank market.
In the euro zone, however, the ECB solves this particular problem through its policy of
adjusting the size of its operations to match the aggregate liquidity need of the entire
banking system (ECB, 2002). But this also means that liquidity in the euro zone is tight.
If one bank has more than it needs, another must have less. This gives rise to the possibility
of short squeezes, and our results indicate that this indeed occurs from time to time. This
has wider implications. The possibility of being squeezed may, for example, reduce banks
propensity to extend credit and thus lead to underinvestment in real assets. The extra
cost of liquidity arising from the possibility of squeezes may also impact on asset prices,
perhaps along the lines modelled by Allen and Gale (1994 and 2004) or Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2008), and contribute towards commonality in liquidity across diﬀerent
securities and asset classes [Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Roll (2000), Hasbrouck and
Seppi (2001), Huberman and Halka (2001), Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005)].
The second broad hypothesis we examine is that the price paid for liquidity is aﬀected
by bank characteristics such as size and type. Allen, Peristiani, and Saunders (1989) ﬁnd
that there are diﬀerences in purchase behavior among diﬀerently sized banks in the federal
funds market [see also Furﬁne (1999)]. The extant literature on the ECB’s operations
suggests that bank size aﬀects the price of liquidity [Nyborg et al (2002), Linzert et al
(2007), and Craig and Fecht (2007)], but again, these papers do not control for banks’
liquidity positions.5 Bank size may matter because of economies of scale and scope. A
larger bank may have better access to the interbank markets, for example because it has
a larger network of regular counterparties or because it has a wider range of collateral. It
4See Gorton and Winton (2003) for a review of the ﬁnancial intermediation literature.
5Nyborg et al (2002) are the ﬁrst to provide evidence suggesting that the price paid for liquidity in
ECB operations is related to bank size. However, they use quantity demanded in the operations as a proxy
for size rather than balance sheet data. In their analysis of size, they also do not control for other bank
characteristics or market conditions. Their main objective lies elsewhere. Craig and Fecht (2007) control
for other factors, including bank type, but do not benchmark the rate paid by banks in the operations by
the contemporaneous interbank rate. Linzert et al (2007) study the longer term operations.
3may also be less exposed to liquidity shocks because it is more diversiﬁed, along the lines
discussed by Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002). A larger bank may also be willing to put
more resources into liquidity management, since it has more to gain from a reduction in
the per unit cost of liquidity.
Our results conﬁrm that size matters; large banks pay less for liquidity in the primary
market. The average auction has a price diﬀerential between the highest and lowest paying
banks of 11.5 bp. Some of this is related to size. The 5% smallest banks pay in excess
of 2 basis points (bp) more than the 1% largest banks, on average across auctions. To
get an idea of the relative magnitude of these numbers, the average volatility of the two-
week interbank rate on main reﬁnancing operation days is 5.3 bp and the average rate
paid in the primary market is 1.2 bp below the contemporaneous rate in the secondary
market. Bank size remains highly signiﬁcant when we control for a variety of other bank
characteristics and market conditions, including banks’ liquidity positions. Documenting
that large banks indeed have a lower cost of liquidity is important because it points to a
source of competitive advantage to size in banking.6 We also ﬁnd that bank size interacts
with our imbalance measure to aﬀect the cost of liquidity; as imbalance grows, so does the
extra cost of liquidity to smaller banks. Thus, smaller banks appear to be more vulnerable
to liquidity squeezes.
The third hypothesis we examine is that belonging to a relationship lending network
reduces the price a bank pays for liquidity. This is motivated by suggestions that such
networks may help banks overcome frictions in the interbank market [Freixas et al (2000)].
Cocco, Gomes, and Martins (2003) ﬁnd evidence that banks create informal such networks
in the interbank market to hedge against adverse liquidity shocks. Furﬁne (1999) presents
evidence suggesting the existence of relationships banking in the federal funds market.
While we do not have data that allow us to identify informal bank networks, in Germany
many such networks exist formally. In particular, every savings and cooperative bank
belongs to formal networks of other savings and cooperative banks. Each network has
6Thus our ﬁndings may be relevant for the literature on the advantages and disadvantages to size in
banking, see e.g., Peek and Rosengren (1998), Berger and Udell (2002), Sapienza (2002), and Berger,
Nathan, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein, (2005).
4its oﬃcial and unique head institution through which liquidity is reallocated within the
network. In contrast, private banks are left to their own devices. Ehrmann and Worms
(2004) suggest that the formal liquidity networks of savings and cooperative banks can
help them overcome disadvantages they may have due to being small. Thus, controlling
for size and other factors, we might expect savings and cooperative banks to have an
advantage over private banks and therefore pay less for liquidity.
However, we ﬁnd almost the opposite. Controlling for size, liquidity position, imbal-
ance, volatility, and other market conditions, cooperatives pay on average .4 bp more than
private banks. That savings banks do not pay less is especially surprising, since they had
governmental guarantees during the sample period. One would expect that the resulting
increase in credit quality would allow savings banks to borrow on superior terms in the
interbank market. A possible reason why savings banks and cooperatives do not pay less
for liquidity than private banks may be that their respective networks do not provide
good diversiﬁcation with respect to liquidity shocks. However, it is hard to see this as an
explanation for why cooperatives pay more. So a fuller explanation to our ﬁndings may
involve an argument along the lines of Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) that formal liquidity
networks are prone to fostering a free-riding problem with respect to liquidity manage-
ment; individual savings banks and cooperatives may free-ride on the eﬀorts of their head
institution, ultimately proving costly for them.7
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional back-
ground on the German banking sector, reserve requirements, and the role of the main
reﬁnancing operations. Section 2 also describes the datasets used in this paper. Section 3
deﬁnes various liquidity status variables and provides descriptive statistics on these vari-
ables as well on the rates banks pay for liquidity, the rates they bid at in the auctions, and
other bidding measures. Section 4 studies the data cross-sectionally. Section 5 presents
the panel analysis and provides the main results of the paper. Section 6 concludes.
7See also Olsen and Zeckhauser’s (1966) seminal paper on free-riding within alliances for an early
discussion of the free-rider problem.
52 Institutional Background and Data
2.1 The Structure of the German Banking Sector
The German banking system is traditionally a system of universal banking and has a
three-pillar structure. The ﬁrst pillar, the private domestic commercial banks, made up
around 40% of the entire banking sector in terms of balance sheet total by the end of
2000. The second pillar are the public banks. This group comprises the savings banks
and the savings banks’ regional head institutions, the Landesbanks, which are jointly
owned by the respective state and the regional association of savings banks. While the
Landesbanks account for 20% of the German banking sector in terms of balance sheet total,
the savings banks had around 16% of the German banking sector’s asset under management
by the end of 2000. The cooperative banking sector with the credit cooperatives and the
cooperative central banks, which are primarily owned by the regional credit cooperatives,
constitute the third pillar. They comprised 12% of the German banking sector of which the
credit cooperatives accounted for 9 percentage points. Besides those major banking groups
special purpose banks (like the Kreditanstalt f¨ ur Wiederaufbau) and buildings societies
(Bausparkassen) account for 7% and 2% of the banking sector, respectively. Branches of
foreign banks operating in Germany made up 2% of the German banking sector by the
end of 2000.8
This three pillar structure aﬀects the way in which liquidity is reallocated in the banking
sector. The public banks as well as the cooperative banking sector form a relatively
closed giro system. On balance, the second-tier institutions – the savings banks and the
credit cooperatives – typically achieve a signiﬁcant liquidity surplus due to their retail
business structure. Within the giro-systems, they pass this excess liquidity on to the
respective (regional) head institution. Consequently, on average in the years 2000 and 2001
savings banks held almost 75% of their interbank overnight deposits with their respective
Landesbank. At the same time only slightly more than 50% of savings banks’ overnight
borrowing was obtained from the regional Landesbank. Similarly, credit cooperatives
8For a more detailed description of the German banking sector see, for example, Hackethal (2004).
6granted more than 90% of their overnight interbank loans to one of the cooperative central
banks, while they only received around 30% of their overnight interbank borrowing from
the cooperative central banks. Conversely, the cooperative cental banks obtained around
60% of the daily interbank liabilities from credit cooperatives, while Landesbanks, however,
received less than 30% of their overnight interbank loans from the regional savings banks.
Instead they obtained the waste majority of their short-term interbank funds from foreign
banks.9 Thus savings (i.e. public) and cooperative banks may have less of a need to
participate directly in the market for reserves than private banks.
2.2 Minimum Reserve Requirements
According to ESCB (European System of Central Banks) regulation all German credit
institution, including subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks in Germany, are subject
to a minimum reserve requirement. The required reserves have to be held as average end-
of-business-day balances over the maintenance period on account with the national central
bank. During the sample period of this paper, reserve maintenance periods had a length
of one month, starting on the 24th of each month and ending on the following 23rd, and
German banks accounted for around 30% of total reserve requirements in the euro zone.
The basis for the calculation of a bank’s reserve requirement is its end-of-calendar-
month short-term liabilities,10 held by non-banks or banks outside the euro area two
months before the maintenance period. For example, a bank’s reserve requirements for
the maintenance period starting May 24th are determined by its short term liabilities on
March 31. The minimum reserve requirement is 2% of these liabilities.11 Thus banks
that are ﬁnanced primarily with short-term liabilities are required to hold relatively more
reserves.
9For a broader discussion of the interbank linkages in the German banking sector in general and within
the three pillars in particular see Deutsche Bundesbank (2000) and Upper and Worms (2004).
10More precisely, these are the overnight deposits, deposits with an agreed maturity up to two years,
deposits redeemable at notice up to two years, and issued debt securities with agreed maturity up to two
years.
11For a more detailed description of the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system see European Central
Bank (2005).
7The required reserve holdings are remunerated at the average stop-out rate of the ECB
main reﬁnancing operations, during the respective maintenance period. Reserve holdings
that exceed the minimum requirement are not remunerated, but can be transferred to the
standing deposit facility which is always 100 basis points below the minimum bid rate in
the auctions. The ECB also operates with a marginal lending facility, where banks can
borrow against collateral at a rate which is 100 basis points above the minimum bid rate
in the auction. Compliance with reserve requirements is a hard constraint; unlike the US,
these cannot be rolled over into the next maintenance period.12
2.3 Main Reﬁnancing Operations
There is a main reﬁnancing operation (or repo auction) every week, each with a tenor
of two weeks during the sample period.13 Thus there are up to ﬁve operations within
each reserve maintenance period. Each operation is timed to coincide with the maturity
of funds obtained in the second-to-previous operation. The operations are scheduled well
in advance; the intended timing of all regular operations in a year are announced three
months before the start of the year. Typically, the operations are scheduled for Tuesdays,
9:30 am, with terms being announced on Mondays, 3:30 pm. Results are announced on
the auction day at 11:20 am. Winning bids are settled the following business day. The
operations are open to all banks in the European Monetary Union that are subject to
12If a bank fails to hold suﬃcient reserves, for example because it fails to make up a reserve shortfall at
the marginal lending facility, the ECB can impose any of the following sanctions: It can require payment
of 1) up to 5 percentage points above the marginal lending rate or 2) up to two times the marginal lending
rate on the diﬀerence between the required and the actually held reserves. Furthermore, the ECB can call
for the provision of non-interest bearing deposits up to three times the amount the respective bank failed to
provide for. The maturity of those deposits must not exceed the period during which the institution failed
to meet the reserve requirement. The ECB can impose additional sanctions if an institution repeatedly
fails to comply with the reserve requirement.
13Once a month, the ECB also holds longer-term reﬁnancing operations with a maturity of three months.
We do not study these operations. See Linzert et al (2007). The ECB may also hold non-regular, ﬁne-
tuning operations with non-standard maturities, for example overnight, but none occurred during the
sample period.
8reserve requirements.
In each operation, or auction, each bidder can submit up to 10 bids which are rate-
quantity pairs for two week money. The tick size is 1 basis point and the quantity multiple
is 100,000 euros. There are no non-competitive bids. There is a pre-announced mini-
mum bid rate. This rate is determined at the meetings of the ECB’s Governing Council,
normally held on the ﬁrst and third Thursday of each month during the sample period.
The minimum bid rate was changed six times during the sample period. It started out
at 4.25%, changed to 4.5% in time for the 5 September 2000 auction, then increased to
4.75% in time for the 11 October 2000 auction, fell back to 4.50% for the auctions held
on and after 14 May 2001, fell further to 4.25% for the auction on and after 4 September
2001, to 3.75% on 18 September 2001 and to 3.25% on 13 November 2001, at which level
it remained until the end of the sample period.
At the time of the auction announcement, the ECB publishes an estimate of liquidity
needs for the entire euro area banking sector for the following week. Given the ECB’s
neutral allotment policy, this provides bidders with an unbiased estimate of the auction
size. We refer to this liquidity neutral amount as the expected auction size. Deviations
may occur because of the lag between the auction announcements (Mondays, 3.30pm)
and the allotment decision (Tuesdays, 11.20am). During this period, the ECB may have
updated its forecast of the banking sector’s liquidity needs. Deviations from the expected
auction size also occur in a few instances where banks in aggregate demanded less than
the liquidity neutral amount, speculating on decreases in the minimum bid rate in time
for the next auction in the maintenance period. However, as documented in Nyborg et
al (2002), deviations tend to be very small, averaging to less than 1% of the pre-announced
liquidity neutral amount. Thus, bidders face little supply uncertainty in these auctions.
2.4 Data
Our analysis makes use of three data sources supplied by the Bundesbank. First, we have
the complete set of bids made by German registered ﬁnancial institutions, broken down by
bidder, in all 78 ECB repo auctions (main reﬁnancing operations) in the period 27 June
92000 to 18 December 2001. This covers 18 reserve maintenance periods. The number of
German bidders in an auction varies from 122 to 546.
Second, we have reserve data from all 2,520 German registered ﬁnancial institutions in
the period May 2000 to December 2001 that were required to hold reserves with the central
bank as of December 2001. The reserve data covers 842 bidders in the main reﬁnancing
operations and 1,678 non-bidders. A bidder is deﬁned as a bank that bids at least once and
therefore appears in the auction dataset. The reserve data consists of each institution’s
cumulative reserve holdings within the maintenance period, as well as its marginal reserve
holding, at the end of each business day preceeding an auction. In addition, we have each
institution’s reserve requirement for each maintenance period over the sample period. The
reserve data are not available for 518 institutions that ceased operating as stand-alone
entities during the sample period. 17 of these submitted bids in the auctions.
Third, we have end-of-month balance sheet data for each bank, also supplied by the
Bundesbank. These come from bank balance sheet statistics that German banks are
required to report to the Bundesbank on a monthly basis. As a measure of size, we thus
use the book value of a bank’s total assets at the end of each calendar month.
Unique bank codes allow us to track banks over time and correlate bidding decisions
with characteristics such as size and fulﬁllment of reserves. The complete bidding data
consists of 59,644 individual bids and 25,345 individual demand schedules from 859 bidders.
Deleting the bids from the 17 bidding banks for which we do not have reserve data reduces
this to 59,156 individual bids and 25,120 individual demand schedules from 842 diﬀerent
bidders. We lack balance sheet data on 7 bidders, taking the number of bidders for which
we have complete data down to 835.
The dataset is pruned further as follows: First, we exclude 45 banks that are registered
with zero reserve requirement in every maintenance period during the sample period.
Second, we throw out two extreme outliers; the ﬁrst is a non-bidder that has an average
reserve fulﬁllment (relative to required reserves) of 190,926%. The second is a bidder with
an average reserve fulﬁllment of 3,011%. Without this bank, the average fulﬁllment of
private domestic bidding banks is 100.1%; with this bank, the average is 131.8%. The
next highest average reserve fulﬁllment among private banks is 146.8%. This takes the
10dataset down to 834 bidders and 1,632 non-bidders. Third, we exclude Bausparkassen and
special purpose banks (14 institutions)14. The analysis below is thus carried out on a ﬁnal
set of 820 bidders (and 23,673 individual demand schedules) and 1,632 non-bidders.
3 Descriptive Statistics
The summary statistics we present in this section break our dataset out in several ways.
First, we diﬀerentiate between bidders, i.e. those banks that submit bids in at least one
auction, and non-bidders. Second, within these two categories, we diﬀerentiate between
six diﬀerent types of banks, as described above; private banks (domestic), savings banks,
cooperatives, branches of foreign banks, Landesbanks, and cooperative central banks.
3.1 Deﬁnitions of Liquidity Status Variables
To measure banks’ liquidity status, we focus on the variables “fulﬁllment” and “normalized
net excess reserves”, described below. These are diﬀerent ways of gauging the extent to
which a bank is short or long reserves going into an auction.
Fulﬁllment is a bank’s cumulative reserve holdings as a percentage of its cumulative





where i refers to the bank, j to the auction, and p to the reserve maintenance period.
Multiplying by 100 means that we express fulﬁllment as a percentage. The fulﬁllment
is measured for each bank using reserve data at the close business the day before each
auction. A fulﬁllment of 100% means that the bank has held reserves thus far in the
maintenance period with a daily average exactly equal to the average daily requirement
14These institutions have very low reserve requirements, averaging to around 0.1% of total assets. This
is substantially lower than for other banking sectors, reﬂecting that they have diﬀerent functions than
typical banks. The Bausparkassen sector also includes several extreme outliers with respect to reserve
fulﬁllment.
11the bank faces this period. Thus, a fulﬁllment of less (more) than 100% indicates that the
bank is short (long).
To deﬁne normalized net excess reserves, we start with the “gross excess reserves”. This
compares the reserves the bank has on deposit with the central bank the evening before
the auction with what it needs to hold on a daily basis for the balance of the reserve
maintenance period in order to exactly fulﬁll reserve requirements.
gross excess reservesijp = holdingijp − required remaining daily holdingijp, (2)
where
required remaining daily holdingijp
=
required total monthly reservesip− cumulative holdingijp
days left of maintenance periodjp
.
(3)
The “net excess reserves” nets out from a bank’s holding the loan from two auctions
ago that matures at the time of the current auction.
net excess reservesijp = gross excess reservesijp − maturing repoijp (4)
where maturing repoijp is the amount the bidder won in auction j −2. Since this amount
matures at the time of auction j, the net excess reserves is what the bank needs to borrow
in the auction in order to be even with respect to its reserve requirements. A negative
(positive) net excess reserves is indicative of the bank being short (long).
We normalize the net excess reserves for size by dividing it by the average daily required
holding:
normalized net excess reservesijp =
net excess reservesijp
average daily required reservesip
× 100. (5)
In a similar way, we also deﬁne the “normalized gross excess reserves” by dividing the
gross excess reserves by the average daily required reserves.
The normalized net excess reserves measure takes into account not only a bank’s ful-
ﬁllment thus far in the maintenance period, but also its liquidity need going forward,
including the need to reﬁnance maturing repos. For this reason, this measure is arguably
a better indicator of liquidity need than fulﬁllment, and we therefore use it in the regres-
sion analysis. Normalization by required reserves means that the measure is independent
12of size, allowing us to distinguish between size and pure liquidity status eﬀects. A bank
that always has a fulﬁllment of 100% and borrows in every auction (borrows in no auction)
will have a negative (zero) normalized net excess reserves going into every auction.
3.2 Liquidity Status and Size Statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics on a comprehensive set of liquidity status variables
for bidding banks, broken down into the six bank categories. Table 2 does the same for
non-bidding banks, but in this case there are only four bank categories since there are no
Landesbanks or cooperative central banks that have not submitted bids in the auctions
over the sample period. Comparing these two tables reveals that the average bidder diﬀers
substantially on two key dimensions from the average non-bidder.
First, category by category, bidders are larger than non-bidders by all size measures;
asset size, reserve requirements, holding of reserves, and required remaining reserves. For
example, for bidding private banks these measures average to (in euros): 22,794 mill (asset
size), 132.43 mill (average daily reserve requirement), 130.53 mill (holdings of reserves on
the evening prior to an operation), and 136.73 mill (average daily remaining required
reserves). The corresponding numbers for non-bidders are: 1,478 mill, 6.99 mill, and 7.71
mill, and 5.96 mill.
Second, bidders are shorter liquidity than non-bidders. For bidders, the average nor-
malized net excess reserves is negative for all bank categories; whereas it is positive for non-
bidders. So by this measure, bidders are short going into the auctions, while non-bidders
are long. The average fulﬁllment is also smaller for bidders than it is for non-bidders. For
example, for private banks: the average normalized net excess reserves is -243.82%, with a
median of -83.39%; while for non-bidders the mean and median are 210.83% and 24.93%,
respectively; and the mean and median fulﬁllment are 100.25% and 101.81% for bidders
as compared with 169.61% and 108.13% for non-bidders. To summarize, non-bidders are
comparatively small and long, while bidders are comparatively large and short.
The tables also show signiﬁcant diﬀerences across bank categories. Focusing on Table 1
(bidders), we see that Landesbanks and cooperative central banks are substantially larger
13than the other categories, including the private banks. Mean asset values are (in euros)
96,918 mill for Landesbanks, and 60,320 mill for cooperative central banks, as compared
with 22,794 mill for private banks, 2,092 mill for savings banks, 678 mill for cooperatives,
and 2,256 mill for branches of foreign banks. So, on average by asset value, Landesbanks
and cooperative central banks are up to 4.5 times larger than private banks. At the same
time, private banks are approximately 10 times larger than savings and foreign banks,
which in turn are approximately 3 times as large as cooperatives. The smallest asset value
in the sample is 25.96 million (a cooperative), and the largest value is 267,591 million (a
domestic private bank).
Mean daily reserve requirements for bidders are: 132.4 million for private banks, 22.1
million for savings banks, 7.8 million for cooperatives, 17.1 million for foreign banks, 352.0
for Landesbanks, and 241.2 for cooperative central banks. By this measure, Landesbanks
and cooperative central banks are on average about 2.5 times larger than private banks.
Private banks are almost 6 times larger than savings banks, almost 8 times larger than
foreign banks, and approximately 17 times larger than cooperatives. The largest average
daily reserve requirement is 2,901.6 million (a domestic private bank). This is quite small
in comparison to a typical auction size of around 90 billion.
There are also diﬀerences in liquidity status among bidding banks. As noted above,
private domestic banks have a mean fulﬁllment of 100.25% . Savings banks and coop-
eratives have similar mean fulﬁllments, 102.65% and 102.94%, respectively. The mean
fulﬁllment across foreign institutions is 142.30%. Landesbanks have the lowest fulﬁllment,
82.44%, while cooperative central banks have a fulﬁllment of 99.00%. So, on average, as
measured by fulﬁllment, German private domestic banks, savings banks, and cooperatives
are slightly long, while cooperative central banks and in particular Landesbanks are short
going into the auctions. However, taking into account maturing repos, all categories of
banks are on average short going into the auctions, as seen by the negative mean and
median normalized net excess reserves. Again, Landesbanks and cooperative central bank
appear to be shorter on average than the other bank categories. There is also substan-
tial variation across individual banks. The smallest average fulﬁllment among bidders is
50.85% (a private bank) and the largest is 685.95% (a foreign bank). The normalized net
14excess reserves varies from −3,739.82% (a private bank) to 968.01% (a foreign bank).
3.3 Pricing and Bidding Measures and Statistics
Table 3 reports on various pricing and bidding characteristics, by bank type. It focuses
on diﬀerent bank categories’ willingness to pay for liquidity and how much these bank
categories end up paying, both in absolute terms and relatively to other bank categories.
This table draws on all banks that bid at least once. For each bank, we measure the
relevant variables ﬁrst for each individual demand schedule (i.e. across the bidders’ set
of bids in a given auction). Then we average across demand schedules for each bank to
obtain a population of bank level observations, whose summary statistics are reported in
the table.
To benchmark bids and rates paid in the main reﬁnancing operations, we follow Nyborg
et al (2002) and use the two week Eonia swap rate taken as the midpoint of the bid and
ask from Reuters quotations at 9:15 a.m. on the auction day. Our pricing variables are:
• Underpricing: This is a measure of the price paid by bidders relative to the con-
temporaneous swap rate. It equals the swap rate less the bidder’s quantity weighted
average winning bids.15
• Relative underpricing: a bidder’s underpricing in a given auction less the average
underpricing in that auction across bidders (in the sample).
• Discount: This is a measure of the willingness to pay. It equals the swap rate less
the bidder’s quantity weighted average bid rate.16
• Relative discount: a bidder’s discount in a given auction less the average discount in
that auction across bidders.
15We call this quantity underpricing because the rate paid is typically below the contemporaneous swap
rate (midpoint of the bid and ask).
16We call this quantity discount because the rate bid is typically below the contemporaneous swap rate
(midpoint of the bid and ask).
15In addition to the pricing variables, we also report on a number of bidding variables, which
help provide a more comprehensive picture of banks’ bidding decisions.
• Stopout deviation: the quantity-weighted standard deviation of bids around the
stopout rate.17 This is a measure of how well a bank predicts the stop-out rate and
therefore aﬀects what it pays for liquidity.
• Award ratio: a bidder’s award in an auction as a percentage of his demand.
• Demand to reserve requirement: demand (summed across individual bids) divided
by the bank’s reserve requirement (in the maintenance period where the auction
occurs).
• Award to total award: a bidder’s award in an auction as a percentage of aggregate
award in that auction to ﬁnancial institutions registered in Germany.
• Bidding frequency: percentage of auctions a bank participates in.18
• Number of bids: the number of interest rate-quantity pairs.
There are substantial diﬀerences across bank categories in the prices paid for liquidity,
as measured by underpricing and relative underpricing. Private banks have an average
underpricing and relative underpricing of 1.24 bp and 0.07 bp, respectively. For savings
banks, the corresponding numbers are 1.66 bp and −0.01 bp; for cooperatives they are
0.78 bp and −0.87 bp; for foreign banks they are 0.69 bp and −0.18 bp; for Landesbanks
they are 1.48 bp and 0.53 bp, and for cooperative central banks they are 2.82 bp and 0.51
bp. Thus Landesbanks are the best performers, having a relative underpricing which is
1.40 bp higher than cooperatives, which are the worst performers. The Landesbanks are
closely followed by the cooperative central banks.19
17The stopout, or marginal, rate is the rate of the lowest winning bid.
18This means that, unlike the other variables in this list, bidding frequency is not an average across a
bank’s demand schedules in diﬀerent auctions.
19A caveat with respect to using the raw underpricing number, instead of the relative underpricing, to
gauge what banks pay relative to each other is that the raw underpricing measure gives more weight to
16We see very similar results when we analyze the willingness to pay for liquidity across
diﬀerent bank categories. This is measured by discount and relative discount. Private
banks have an average discount and relative discount of 3.04 bp and 0.14 bp, respectively.
For savings banks, the corresponding numbers are 3.32 bp and −0.09 bp; for cooperatives
they are 3.47 bp and −0.18 bp; for foreign banks they are 2.84 bp and −0.15 bp; for
Landesbanks they are 2.83 bp and 0.50 bp, and for cooperative central banks they are
4.27 bp and 0.45 bp. Thus Landesbanks and cooperative central banks, followed by the
private banks, are willing to pay less for liquidity than the rest of the banks.
The stopout deviation captures the banks’ ability to correctly predict the stopout rate
in a given auction. It is lowest for the Landesbanks, 1.04 bp, and cooperative central banks,
1.17 bp, and highest for the cooperatives, 2.80 bp. These results are thus consistent again
with the larger relative underpricing we observe for the Landesbanks and cooperative
central banks.
The award ratio measures the relative aggressiveness of a bidder. An award ratio of
100% in a given auction means that all of a bidder’s bids won, i.e. all his bids were above
the stop-out rate. Thus the bidder can be said to have been highly aggressive relative to
other bidders. An award ratio of 0 is indicative of very cautious bidding. Cooperative
central banks have the lowest award ratio, 42.34%, followed by the Landesbanks with an
award ratio of 48.54%. There are only relatively small diﬀerences in award ratios across
the other bank categories. The range is from 54.90% for private banks to 58.97% for
cooperatives.
The award to total award varies between 0.03% (cooperatives), 0.09% (savings), 0.17%
(foreign), 0.63% (private), 1.45% (cooperative central banks), and 1.68% (Landesbanks).
The maximum is 11.58% (a private domestic bank). These numbers illustrate how small
any bank in this market is compared to the market size.
The average demand to reserve requirement ratio goes from 249.83% (cooperatives)
to 1221.95% (cooperative central banks). These high averages are inﬂuenced by some
the early auctions in the sample period, since these auctions had a higher participation rate (see Nyborg
et al (2002) for a discussion of the decreasing time trend in the number of bidders). Since interbank rates
were higher around these auctions, the underpricing in these auctions was higher than in later auctions.
17extremely large observations. The largest single observation is 12,124.14% (a private bank).
Landesbanks participate more frequently than other banks, speciﬁcally they bid on
average in 80.45% of the 78 auctions. Cooperative bidders participate in the fewest number
of auctions, only 27.51%. As seen by comparing Tables 1 and 2 the cooperative sector also
has the smallest participation rate, as measured by the percentage of banks in the sector
that bid at least once. The average number of bids per demand schedule varies from 1.87
(foreign banks) to 3.51 (cooperative central banks).
The univariate statistics for the pricing and bidding variables in this section do not
control for other important factors such as the size of a bank and auction speciﬁc exogenous
variables. This will be addressed in the subsequent regression analysis.
4 Cross-Sectional Analysis
Our objective in this section is to produce a ﬁrst take of some patterns that are apparent
in the data, especially with respect to the relation between a bank’s size and the price it
pays for liquidity. The cross-sectional analysis in this section is reﬁned in the next section
where we take advantage of the panel structure of the data. In the current section, the
focus is necessarily on features that are permanent or relatively time invariant, i.e., bank
size and type. We start by tabulating descriptive statistics for diﬀerent size groups, along
similar lines as what we did in the previous section for diﬀerent bank types. We then
present cross-sectional regressions of the price banks pay for liquidity and their willingness
to pay, as well as some other performance variables, on bank size, a bank’s typical liquidity
position, and bank type.
4.1 Size Sorted Groups
We divide the sample of bidders and non-bidders, excluding Landesbanks and cooperative
central banks, into two sets of 12 size groups, sorted by average asset value. That is, for all
bidders, we ﬁrst calculate each bank’s average asset value throughout the sample period
and place the banks into the following percentile groupings: 0 - 5, 6 -10, 11 - 20, 21 - 40,
1841 - 60, 61 -80, 91 - 95, 96, 97, 98, and 99. We do the same for non-bidders.
We report on liquidity status statistics across auctions for these groups in Table 4.
Panel (a) reports on bidders and panel (b) on non-bidders. Focusing on bidders, the
average asset value for banks in the 99th percentile is 105,928.50 million euros, while the
average size of banks in the 0-5th percentiles is 71.22 million. This illustrates that there
is a large heterogeneity in terms of size. With respect to liquidity positions, the table
shows that the average normalized net excess reserves is negative for all size groups, with
large banks being more short than small banks. For example, it is −372.45% for the 99th
percentile and −14.70% for the smallest size group. Large banks are more short also by
other measures; for example, the 99th percentile has an average normalized gross excess
reserves of −8.11% versus 39.00% for the smallest size group, and an average fulﬁllment
going into an auction of 94.00% versus 111.61% for the smallest size group. A possible
reason for why large banks take shorter positions is that they are involved in a greater
range of business and are thus fundamentally better insured against adverse liquidity
shocks [along the lines discussed in Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002)].
In contrast to bidders, panel (b) shows that for all non-bidding size groups, the gross
excess reserves is positive, illustrating again that bidders tend to be more short than non-
bidders.20 Paralleling the result for bidding banks, we also see that among non-bidders,
larger banks are also less long than smaller banks.
Table 5 provides price and bidding statistics for the same size groups as in Table 4.
Focusing on our measures for the relative price of liquidity, we see that these vary sub-
stantially among groups. Underpricing is negative for the three smallest groups (up to
the bottom 20 percent), and relative underpricing is negative for the six smallest groups
(up to the bottom 80 percent). The diﬀerences in underpricing and relative underpricing,
respectively, between the 99th percentile and the 0-5th percentiles are 2.09 bp and 2.06
bp. But the best performing percentile is actually the 97th, which has an underpricing
of 1.35 bp as compared with .76 for the 99th percentile. These diﬀerences reﬂect a larger
willingness to pay among smaller banks, as revealed by their larger discount. However, the
20Note that for non-bidders, the gross excess reserves is the identical to the net excess reserves, since
there is no maturing repo for these banks.
19diﬀerence in discounts between the largest and smallest size groups only explains approxi-
mately 1 basis point of the 2 bp diﬀerence in what they pay. The extra diﬀerence appears
to be due to larger banks having a smaller stopout deviation; the 99th percentile group
has a stopout deviation of 1.09 bp versus 2.78 bp for the smallest 0-5th percentile. This
increased precision of larger banks’ bids, relative to the stopout rate, means that larger
banks tend to win with lower bids than smaller banks, contributing to larger banks ob-
taining liquidity at a cheaper price. Finally, we note that the higher bids of small bidders
is reﬂected in their higher award ratios, this is 65.36% for the group of the smallest banks
but only 52.40% for those in the 97th percentile.
The table also reports on group level statistics; number bidders, fraction winners,
standard deviation of discount, and award to total award. For each group, these are
calculated for each auction, with the table reporting the means across the auctions. From
the perspective of what banks pay for liquidity, the most interesting group variable is
arguably the standard deviation of discounts. This tells us how much bids are spread out
within a group in an auction. It complements the stopout deviation. The group standard
deviation of discounts is 1.41 bp for the 99th percentile size group versus 3.63 bp for the
0-5th percentile. Thus, in the smaller size group, we see more extreme bidding, which in
turn leads to smaller banks winning with larger bids, and thus ending up paying more.
To conclude, from Tables 4 and 5, we see a sharp size eﬀect in the primary market for
liquidity; large banks have shorter positions, yet are willing to pay less, and end up paying
less, as compared with smaller banks.
4.2 Regression Analysis
For each bidding bank, we consider the following dependent variables, as averages across
the auctions where the bank participated or won some units:21 underpricing, relative
underpricing, discount, relative discount, stopout deviation, award ratio, and demand to
reserve requirements. As independent variables, we employ for each bank: the natural
21Underpricing and relative underpricing can only be calculated conditional on winning. The other
dependent variables are calculated conditional on bidding.
20log of the bank’s assets and the net normalized excess reserves, both as averages over the
sample period. We also include bank sector dummy variables for savings, cooperatives,
foreign banks, Landesbanks, and cooperative central banks, thus taking private domestic
banks as the benchmark. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity by using the
Huber/White estimate of variance.
The results of these cross-sectional regressions are reported in Table 6. With respect to
bank size, the ﬁndings are consistent with those above; the price of liquidity increases in
bank size. The coeﬃcient on ln(assets) in the underpricing regression is .2. In other words,
an increase in size (in millions) by a factor of e leads to a .2 bp increase in underpricing.
The coeﬃcient on the normalized net excess reserves is positive, but insigniﬁcant. There
is thus weak evidence that bidders that are “more long” have lower underpricing.
The regression evidence on the underpricing size eﬀect can be compared to the increase
in underpricing in the larger size groups as reported in Table 5. Going from the smallest
group to the 98th and 99th percentile groups represents an increase in the natural log
of the average asset size of approximately 5.8 and 7.2, respectively. According to the
regression results, this gives an increase in underpricing from the lowest to the 98th and
99th percentile groups of approximately 1.17 bp and 1.45 bp, respectively. This is lower
than the diﬀerences reported in Table 5 of 2.21 bp and 2.06 bp, respectively. This reﬂects
that the smallest group has an exceedingly poor performance. Comparing the second
smallest size group (6-10th percentile) to the 98th percentile, we have an increase in
ln(asset size) of approximately 5.2, which according to the regression results gives an
increase in underpricing 1.05 bp. This is in line with the numbers in Table 5, which shows
a diﬀerence of 1.19 bp.
The regression results in Table 6 on the discount shows that this measure is not related
to bank size. This is surprising given the strong relation between underpricing and bank
size. It is also in contrast to the results from the size sorted groups. A diﬀerence now, of
course, is that the regression controls for liquidity positions and bank type. Looking at
the stopout deviation regression, we see that the reason large banks end up paying less is
that they cluster their bids tighter around the stop-out rate than do smaller banks, as can
be seen from the negative coeﬃcient on ln(assets).
21Looking at the coeﬃcients of the net normalized excess reserves in the seven regressions
in Table 6, we see that we cannot conclude that banks pay more for liquidity, the shorter
they are, contrary to what one might expect. Of course, since a bank’s liquidity position
changes over time, cross-sectional regressions are not the appropriate way to examine the
eﬀect of liquidity positions.
5 Panel Regressions
This section contains the main analysis of the paper. We start by running plain panel
regressions on the sample of bidding banks, examining the impact on the key pricing
and bidding variables of a range of bank characteristics and market conditions. We then
examine the robustness of these ﬁndings by running Heckman selection regressions to take
into account a bank’s decision to participate in a given auction, using bidding as well as
non-bidding banks.
5.1 Explanatory Variables
The explanatory variables can be divided into four categories. First, we have the (more or
less) permanent bank characteristics, ln(assets) and bank type. Second, we have liquidity
condition variables, which include a temporary bank characteristic, normalized net excess
reserves; a market condition, imbalance; and two interaction variables, imbalance×nex
(nex is the normalized net excess reserves) and imbalance×ln(assets). Third, we have
auction speciﬁc market conditions, expected auction size and the size ratio. Fourth, we
have interbank rate variables, the swap spread, the negative swap spread, and volatility.
These are described in more detail below (but not the bank characteristics, which are
discussed in earlier sections).
Liquidity position variables: We use our reserve position data to calculate a measure of
imbalance in the market. In particular, for each operation, we deﬁne imbalance to be the
standard deviation of the normalized net excess reserves across all banks, bidders and non-
bidders alike. The purpose of including this variable in our regressions is to examine the
22hypothesis that liquidity is more expensive when there is a greater imbalance in liquidity
positions across banks. For each bank, we interact imbalance with the normalized net
excess reserves (nex), in order to examine the extent to which more short banks may be
more vulnerable to a greater imbalance in the market. Under the hypothesis that short
squeezing is an issue, Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) show that a greater dispersion of
holdings across banks leads to more aggressive bidding by shorts that are subject to the
possibility of being squeezed as well as by banks that have suﬃcient market power to
implement a squeeze. Given the importance of bank size, documented in the previous
section, we also interact imbalance with ln(assets) to examine the extent to which smaller
banks may have a further disadvantage in more imbalanced markets.
Operation speciﬁc market conditions: Under the hypothesis that positions matter and
that short squeezing may be a concern, we would expect that the price of liquidity is
larger when the operation oﬀers a poor opportunity for reﬁnancing maturing loans from
the operations two weeks ago. To examine this, we deﬁne the size ratio to be the expected
size of the current operation as a percentage of the size of the operation two weeks ago,
and which now needs to be reﬁnanced. To control for the absolute size of an auction, we
include the expected auction size, deﬁned as the liquidity neutral amount as announced by
the ECB the afternoon before the operation.
Interbank rate variables: Following Nyborg et al. (2002), we deﬁne the swap spread as
the two week Eonia swap rate at 9:15 on the auction day (see above) less the minimum bid
rate in the auction. We also follow these authors in calculating the conditional volatility of
the swap rate using a modiﬁed GARCH model, based on daily observations at 9:15 am (see
Appendix 2) in the period 4 January 1999 to 20 December 2001. All these variables are
shown by Nyborg et al to aﬀect bidder behavior in the ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations.
The swap spread, in particular, contributes to a high R2. We also deﬁne the negative swap
spread as dummy variable which is 1 if the swap rate is below the minimum bid rate and
zero otherwise. Nyborg et al ﬁnd that this occurs for some auctions and that it has an
adverse impact on bidders’ demand.
Summary statistics for the market condition variables, including the two interaction
variables, are in Table 7. Imbalance has a mean of 1,144% and a standard deviation of
233,331%. It is highly skewed; the minimum is 86%, the median is 400%, and the maxi-
mum is 26,997%. Imbalance×nex has a mean of -208,065%2 and a standard deviation of
approximately 10 times that. Imbalance×ln(assets) has a mean of 7,543 and a standard
deviation of around three times that. The size ratio averages to 1.24 and has a standard
deviation of 1.75. Its minimum is .2 and its maximum is 15.8, illustrating that there is a
substantial range in this measure. There is substantially larger scope to reﬁnance a repo
when the current auction is 15.8 times larger than the previous one as compared with
when the size ratio is merely .2. The expected auction size has an average of 84.256 billion
euros, with a standard deviation of 28.829 billion. On auction days, the swap spread has
an average of 5.91 bp, with a standard deviation of 8.66 bp. The volatility of the swap
rate has an average of 5.32 bp on auction days, with a standard deviation of 1.33 bp.
5.2 Panel Regressions without Heckman Correction
In this subsection, we run panel regressions of underpricing, relative underpricing, discount,
relative discount, stopout deviation, award ratio, and demand to reserve requirement on
the explanatory variables discussed above. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedas-
ticity by using the Huber/White estimate of variance and are clustered on the auctions.
Table 8 reports the results. Each column represents a diﬀerent regression, and we
discuss each in turn. The underpricing regression conﬁrms our earlier results that large
banks pay less for liquidity; the coeﬃcient on ln(size) in the underpricing regression is a
statistically signiﬁcant (at the 1% level) 0.155. Looking at the bank type dummies, we
see that only the cooperatives have an underpricing which is statistically diﬀerent from
that of private banks. Controlling for all other factors, cooperatives pay .359 bp more for
liquidity than private banks.
With respect to the liquidity position variables, note ﬁrst that the coeﬃcient on the
normalized net excess reserves is statistically insigniﬁcant. However, the coeﬃcient on im-
balance is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, meaning that the price of liquidity in the
primary market relative to the contemporaneous swap rate increases when there is greater
imbalance in liquidity positions across banks. The eﬀect is also economically signiﬁcant,
24given the magnitudes that we are dealing with in this market. A one standard deviation
increase in imbalance leads to a decrease in underpricing of approximately .4 bp. The co-
eﬃcient on the interaction variable imbalance×nex is positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
A one standard deviation increase in this variable has a .04 bp eﬀect on underpricing.
This shows that as imbalance increases, banks pay more for liquidity the shorter they are.
The interaction variable imbalance×ln(assets) is also positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
In this case, a one standard deviation increase in the independent variable leads to an
increase in underpricing of approximately .1 bp. In other words, as imbalance increases,
large banks suﬀer less than small banks, in terms of the price they pay for liquidity.
Turning now to the operation speciﬁc market condition variables, the coeﬃcients on
the size ratio and the expected size are .097 and .030, respectively, both signiﬁcant at the
1% level. So as the auction size grows, the price paid for liquidity falls. The positive
coeﬃcient on expected size may reﬂect that increasingly expensive collateral has to be
used as the auction size grows, as suggested by Nyborg et al (2002). The positive size
ratio coeﬃcient tells us that the price of liquidity gets relatively more expensive when the
scope for reﬁnancing falls. This illustrates that aggregate positions matter.
Finally, the interbank rate variables follow the results previously documented by Ny-
borg et al (2002). Underpricing increases in the swap spread and decreases in volatility.
The negative swap spread dummy variable obviously has a negative coeﬃcient, since bids
below the minimum bid rate are not admissible.
The relative underpricing regression is similar, except that most of the market condition
variables are now insigniﬁcant, as one would expect. The coeﬃcient on imbalance and the
two interaction variables, however, are still statistically signiﬁcant. The negative coeﬃcient
on imbalance is interesting. It means that the distribution of the price paid for liquidity
across banks in an operation is skewed towards higher rates. This is consistent with the
view that a larger imbalance leads to a larger chance of a liquidity squeeze.
The discount regression is also in line with the underpricing regression, but with some
notable exceptions. First, paralleling the cross-sectional regressions, we see that ln(assets)
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Second, the normalized net excess reserves is
now signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient is 2.4 × 10−4, showing that
25the shorter a banks is the smaller is the discount. This is equivalent to saying that a
one standard deviation (for private banks) decrease in the normalized net excess reserve,
leads to increase in the relative willingness to pay by approximately .1 bp. The interaction
variable imbalance×nex is not diﬀerent from zero, in contrast to the underpricing. Savings
banks have a lower discount, and thus a higher willingness to pay, than private banks, yet
do not end up paying more. Most of these diﬀerences seem to be explained by the stopout
deviation regression. For example, savings banks have a signiﬁcantly smaller stopout
deviation than private banks. So even though they have lower discounts, they do not end
up paying more.
The award ratio regression shows that this variable tends to decrease in bank size and
the normalized net excess reserve. In other words, smaller and shorter banks are relatively
more aggressive within an auction than large and less short banks. The coeﬃcients on
the two interaction variables, show that as imbalance increases, a bank’s aggressiveness in
the auction gets relatively smaller the longer and larger it is. This supports the evidence
from the underpricing regression that smaller and shorter banks are more vulnerable to
liquidity squeezes, given that imbalance measures the potential for a squeeze.
The demand to reserves requirements regression shows that a bank’s total demand
relative to its reserves is decreasing in the normalized net excess reserves, i.e., banks
demand more relatively more the shorter they are.
To summarize, the panel regressions conﬁrm the ﬁnding from our cross-sectional analy-
sis that banks pay more for liquidity the smaller they are. In addition, the panel regressions
show that liquidity positions aﬀect the price paid for liquidity and the willingness to pay.
But it is not just a bank’s own position that matters; it is especially how liquidity is
distributed across banks. The more imbalance there is, the more are banks willing to pay
and the more do they end up paying, especially the shorter and smaller they are.
5.3 Panel Regressions with Heckman Correction
The Heckman selection model combines a selection mechanism for participating in the
main reﬁnancing operation with a regression model. Indexing banks by i and operations




0wij + µij. (6)
The regression model is
yij = β
0xij + ￿ij, (7)
where (µij,￿ ij) are assumed to be bivariate normal [0,0,1,σ ￿,ρ].
z∗
ij is not observed; the variable is observed as zij =1i fz∗
ij > 0 and 0 otherwise with
probabilities Prob(zij =1 )=Φ ( γ0wij) and Prob(zij = 0) = 1-Φ(γ0wij). zi = 1 indicates that
the bank participates and Φ is the standardized normal cumulative distribution function.




The model is estimated by maximum likelihood, see Greene (2000), which provides
consistent, asymptotically eﬃcient parameter estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity by using the Huber/White estimate of variance and are clustered at the
auction level.
The set of explanatory variables, x, in the regression model are the same as in the panel
regressions in the previous subsection. In the selection equation, we use two additional
variables, namely maturing repo and last auction. Maturing repo is 1 if the bank won some
units two operations ago, and last auction is the aggregate underpricing in the previous
main reﬁnancing operation. We expect that a bank is more likely to participate if it has
to reﬁnance (maturing repo is 1). The results are virtually the same with or without the
variable last auction.
The Heckman model is run on the full dataset, including bidding banks and non-
bidding banks. Results are in Table 9. Panel (a) presents the regression model, panel (b)
the selection model, and panel (c) provides statistics on the parameters. Comparing
panel (a) to the plain panel regression in Table 8, we see very few notable diﬀerences. The
variables that were signiﬁcant remain so, though sometimes with altered p-levels, and the
coeﬃcients are very close to what they were before. Outside of the demand to reserves
requirement regression, the only exception appears to be ln(assets) in the relative discount
27regression, which loses signiﬁcance. New variables do not become signiﬁcant in any of the
regressions. The conclusions from the previous subsection remain intact.
In panel (b), we see that the selection equation is virtually the same for the diﬀerent
independent variables. This illustrates its robustness. We note that increased bank size is
associated with a larger likelihood to participate, as is being a savings bank. Cooperatives
and foreign banks are less likely to participate. With respect to liquidity status, we see
that a larger imbalance is associated with a larger participation rate, consistent with the
interpretation that this variable is associated with squeezes; the more likely a squeeze is,
the more important it is to participate in order to cover one’s short position, or possibly
being able to squeeze. A bank is also more likely to participate when the size ratio is
large. This is not surprising, since a larger relative auction size is indicative of an increased
need for liquidity in the banking system. Banks are also more likely to participate when
the swap spread is large, perhaps because this is associated with larger underpricing. A
negative swap spread is, not surprisingly, associated with less participation. An increase
in volatility and expected auction size are both associated with an increased likelihood of
bidding. The positive coeﬃcients on maturing repo and last auction conﬁrm that banks
are more likely to participate if they have a reﬁnancing need and also when the previous
auction was highly underpriced.
Panel c reports the diﬀerent parameters for the Heckman estimation, i.e. ρ, σ, and
λ. The results suggest that these parameters are signiﬁcant for each of the estimations,
except for the underpricing estimation. In particular, the correlation of the residuals in
the bidding and performance model and the selection model, which is captured by ρ,i s
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This suggests that is important to use the Heckman approach
to take into account the decision whether to submit a bid for the analysis of how bidders
submit their bids. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the results from the Heckman panel
regression are virtually the same as in the plain panel regression.
286 Conclusion
This paper documents that the price of liquidity systematically depends on bank charac-
teristics and market conditions. We speciﬁcally test three hypotheses, which are derived
from economic theory, and ﬁnd the following results. First, our ﬁndings are consistent
with the existence of periodically occurring liquidity squeezes. A greater imbalance in
liquidity positions across banks is associated with a rise in the price of liquidity, relative
to the benchmark, as predicted by the theoretical work by Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004).
Furthermore, the shorter a bank is the more adversely it is aﬀected by an increase in
imbalance, ceteris paribus. Since the sample period of this paper is a time of relative
normalcy in the interbank markets, this shows that liquidity squeezes are not just a crisis
phenomenon.
Second, we document a systematic relation between bank size and the price of liquidity.
Controlling for a variety of factors, we ﬁnd that larger banks pay less than do smaller
banks. This eﬀect is even more pronounced when there is an increase in the imbalance
of the liquidity positions. Smaller banks thus appear to be more vulnerable to a liquidity
squeeze, ceteris paribus. This may also help explain why smaller banks tend to be relatively
less short than larger banks prior to reﬁnancing operations.
Third, we ﬁnd that membership in a formal relationship lending network does not
reduce the price a bank pays for liquidity. German savings and cooperative banks, which
formally belong to these networks, do not pay less than other banks, which are not part of
these networks. Cooperative banks even bid and pay more than other banks. This gives
rise to the notion that these formal networks may induce banks to free-ride on the eﬀorts
of other banks in the network (as discussed in the Introduction). An alternative view is
that cooperatives and savings banks that participate in the main reﬁnancing operations
do so because they experience rationing by their respective networks, and this may give
them an increased willingness to pay for liquidity in the market.
There are several ways this line of research can be broadened. For example, a pertinent
question is whether banks with poor collateral or low quality balance sheets are more
exposed to adverse liquidity conditions and therefore bid and pay more in the primary
29market. That underpricing in the main reﬁnancing operations is increasing in the size of
the operation is consistent with the view that diﬀerent collateral have diﬀerent opportunity
costs. Data on individual bank collateral holdings, however, is very hard to obtain.
Another important issue is how the eﬀects we have uncovered would play out during
a crisis period. For example, that small banks are more adversely aﬀected by increases in
the liquidity imbalance in the banking sector, ceteris paribus, suggests that small banks
would be more vulnerable in a crisis. On the other hand, since small banks tend to be
less short than large banks, it is possible that the net eﬀect of a crisis may be worse for
large banks than small ones. Thus, while our ﬁndings are consistent with the view that
large banks have better access to the interbank market for liquidity than smaller banks, it
is not clear how they would fare if this market would seize up.
Finally, our ﬁnding that there are imperfections in the market for liquidity even during
times of normalcy leaves us with the hypothesis that the current crisis represents a ﬂaring
up of these imperfections. This is an important issue to settle for future research.
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34Appendix 1: Tables
Table 1: Liquidity Status by Bank Type: Bidders
Descriptive statistics on the major variables for six types of banks as classiﬁed by the Deutsche
Bundesbank: Private banks, savings banks, cooperatives, foreign banks, Landesbanks, and
cooperative central banks. The liquidity variables are deﬁned in Section 3.1. All variables are
collected for each bank the day before each auction and means are calculated for each bank
(unconditionally, i.e., not conditional on the bidding decision). The table reports summary
statistics of these means across banks within each bank type.
units mean median std s.e. min max N
Panel (a): Private Banks
Assets mill 22794 4149 52774 5472 62 267591 93
Reserve requirement (daily) mill 132.43 20.25 438.16 45.44 0.20 2901.60 93
Holding mill 130.53 21.17 431.59 44.75 0.01 2952.42 93
Fulﬁllment % 100.25 101.81 15.53 1.61 50.85 157.03 93
Remaining res req (daily) mill 136.73 18.93 443.94 46.03 -0.40 2689.52 93
Gross excess reserves mill -6.74 0.82 56.54 5.86 -336.59 229.81 93
Normalized % 14.55 9.42 41.83 4.34 -77.78 244.37 93
Maturing repo mill 188.95 14.78 608.30 63.08 0.00 4426.27 93
Norm net excess reserves % -243.82 -83.39 530.25 54.98 -3739.82 212.39 93
Panel (b): Savings Banks
Assets mill 2092 1307 2754 144 170 31385 366
Reserve requirement (daily) mill 22.06 14.31 27.48 1.44 1.26 314.89 366
Holding mill 22.07 14.15 26.84 1.40 1.25 289.04 366
Fulﬁllment % 102.65 101.36 6.08 0.32 84.22 133.01 366
Remaining res req (daily) mill 20.80 13.41 29.41 1.54 1.30 395.77 366
Gross excess reserves mill 1.23 0.69 6.42 0.34 -105.98 20.62 366
Normalized % 7.48 6.05 9.35 0.49 -35.88 40.76 366
Maturing repo mill 22.17 6.08 54.64 2.86 0.00 717.68 366
Norm net excess reserves % -81.53 -34.98 126.12 6.59 -1187.84 25.81 366
Panel (c): Cooperatives
Assets mill 678 350 1380 77 26 18582 324
Reserve requirement (daily) mill 7.81 4.04 13.25 0.74 0.24 127.10 324
Holding mill 7.98 4.03 14.71 0.82 0.23 171.05 324
Fulﬁllment % 102.94 101.49 8.15 0.45 74.05 159.71 324
Remaining res req (daily) mill 7.18 3.65 12.16 0.68 0.22 112.85 324
Gross excess reserves mill 0.78 0.21 4.03 0.22 -4.38 69.38 324
Normalized % 9.42 5.69 13.17 0.73 -48.10 70.77 324
Maturing repo mill 3.63 0.63 11.59 0.64 0.00 123.88 324
Norm net excess reserves % -31.90 -9.14 66.10 3.67 -585.01 44.27 324
35Table 1: (cont.)
units mean median std s.e. min max N
Panel (d): Foreign Banks
Assets mill 2256 1135 2586 564 31 8009 21
Reserve requirement (daily) mill 17.09 8.94 18.91 4.13 0.02 62.31 21
Holding mill 18.77 7.88 21.36 4.66 0.28 66.69 21
Fulﬁllment % 142.30 99.40 139.77 30.50 71.77 685.95 21
Remaining res req (daily) mill 17.90 7.79 20.33 4.44 -0.94 70.42 21
Gross excess reserves mill 0.99 0.34 3.71 0.81 -6.20 12.00 21
Normalized % 103.94 12.67 278.41 60.75 -14.55 965.91 21
Maturing repo mill 26.28 6.99 46.96 10.25 0.00 169.07 21
Norm net excess reserves % -206.53 -24.12 663.91 144.88 -1950.78 968.01 21
Panel (e): Landesbanks
Assets mill 96918 73940 68435 19755 12539 228659 12
Reserve requirement (daily) mill 351.98 266.25 265.26 76.57 21.09 854.93 12
Holding mill 369.58 245.31 288.31 83.23 21.46 943.14 12
Fulﬁllment % 82.44 83.95 9.37 2.70 69.08 100.17 12
Remaining res req (daily) mill 405.77 277.07 297.08 85.76 24.08 902.33 12
Gross excess reserves mill -34.54 -26.14 63.08 18.21 -209.27 34.90 12
Normalized % -11.86 -11.60 12.04 3.47 -38.78 6.88 12
Maturing repo mill 545.51 414.61 552.43 159.47 65.83 1751.84 12
Norm net excess reserves % -217.10 -162.26 166.75 48.14 -596.13 -60.01 12
Panel (f): Cooperative Central Banks
Assets mill 60320 39921 53767 26884 22081 139357 4
Reserve requirement (daily) mill 241.17 113.85 277.29 138.64 80.54 656.42 4
Holding mill 244.55 116.24 267.69 133.85 99.79 645.91 4
Fulﬁllment % 99.00 98.22 10.29 5.15 87.33 112.22 4
Remaining res req (daily) mill 240.30 123.19 268.81 134.40 72.92 641.90 4
Gross excess reserves mill 6.22 4.44 16.54 8.27 -10.87 26.87 4
Normalized % 6.76 -0.11 18.00 9.00 -6.10 33.36 4
Maturing repo mill 389.05 318.50 292.75 146.37 147.62 771.57 4
Norm net excess reserves % -261.95 -157.97 268.94 134.47 -660.64 -71.21 4
36Table 2: Liquidity Status by Bank Type: Non-Bidders
Descriptive statistics on the major variables for six types of banks as classiﬁed by the Deutsche
Bundesbank: Private banks, savings banks, cooperatives, foreign banks, Landesbanks, and
cooperative central banks. (Note that there are no non-bidders among Landesbanks and
cooperative central banks.) The liquidity variables are deﬁned in Section 3.1. All variables
are collected for each bank the day before each auction. Note that for non-bidders, there is
no diﬀerence between gross and net excess reserves as there never is a maturing repo.
units mean median std s.e. min max N
Panel (a): Private Banks
Assets mill 1477.72 242.03 6847.49 665.09 11.11 69252.90 106
Reserve requirement (daily) mill 6.99 1.71 16.73 1.62 0.01 131.21 106
Holding mill 7.71 2.15 17.67 1.72 0.03 134.53 106
Fulﬁllment % 169.61 108.13 279.13 27.11 26.84 2073.32 106
Remaining res req (daily) mill 5.96 1.34 16.11 1.56 -16.40 111.36 106
Gross excess reserves mill 1.74 0.46 4.33 0.42 -5.77 23.70 106
Norm net excess reserves % 210.83 24.93 808.20 78.50 -141.97 5584.70 106
Panel (b): Savings Banks
Assets mill 894.65 682.85 748.57 55.34 61.38 4573.03 183
Reserve requirement (daily) mill 10.10 7.60 8.59 0.63 0.61 43.16 183
Holding mill 10.12 7.63 8.57 0.63 0.80 41.79 183
Fulﬁllment % 102.67 101.32 6.24 0.46 88.77 135.04 183
Remaining res req (daily) mill 9.33 7.10 7.99 0.59 0.01 42.26 183
Gross excess reserves mill 0.77 0.32 1.43 0.11 -0.95 9.21 183
Norm net excess reserves % 8.30 6.21 12.77 0.94 -10.25 129.95 183
Panel (c): Cooperatives
Assets mill 234.38 148.17 302.07 8.46 11.52 4220.17 1275
Reserve requirement (daily) mill 2.86 1.84 3.58 0.10 0.01 40.26 1275
Holding mill 2.89 1.87 3.59 0.10 0.07 40.78 1275
Fulﬁllment % 105.93 101.06 79.51 2.23 74.53 2476.16 1275
Remaining res req (daily) mill 2.70 1.69 3.48 0.10 -1.51 41.10 1275
Gross excess reserves mill 0.19 0.09 0.48 0.01 -3.16 6.99 1275
Norm net excess reserves % 25.33 5.98 325.48 9.12 -233.86 9219.97 1275
Panel (d): Foreign Banks
Assets mill 1474.30 423.37 2976.73 405.08 12.39 15486.32 54
Reserve requirement (daily) mill 9.61 2.06 27.29 3.71 0.00 191.84 54
Holding mill 11.62 3.01 30.18 4.11 0.04 211.32 54
Fulﬁllment % 535.17 114.50 1414.76 192.52 52.87 8213.70 54
Remaining res req (daily) mill 7.94 1.33 24.78 3.37 -17.23 168.70 54
Gross excess reserves mill 3.74 0.90 7.60 1.03 -2.17 45.32 54
Norm net excess reserves % 1697.84 54.23 5726.84 779.32 -15.89 35075.25 54
37Table 3: Pricing and Bidding Statistics for Individual Banks by Type
Descriptive statistics on bidding and performance variables for six types of banks as classiﬁed
by the Deutsche Bundesbank: Private banks, savings banks, cooperatives, foreign banks,
Landesbanks, and cooperative central banks. The variables are deﬁned in the itemized list
in Section 3.3. Averaging by bank: Means of each variable are calculated ﬁrst for each bank.
The reported statistics are then calculated across banks for each bank type. Conditional on
bidding.
units mean std s.e. min max N
Panel (a): Private Banks
Underpricing bp 1.24 1.75 0.19 -5.50 5.58 89
Relative underpricing bp 0.07 0.86 0.09 -3.47 1.65 89
Discount bp 3.04 2.07 0.21 -4.50 9.69 93
Relative discount bp 0.14 1.57 0.16 -4.89 5.92 93
Stopout deviation bp 1.63 0.94 0.10 0.70 5.40 93
Award ratio % 54.90 23.75 2.46 0.00 100.00 93
Demand to reserve req % 909.07 1749.32 182.38 15.07 12124.14 92
Award to total award % 0.63 1.69 0.18 0.00 11.58 93
Bidding frequency % 48.95 32.40 3.36 1.28 98.72 93
Number of bids 2.18 0.72 0.07 1.00 4.57 93
Panel (b): Savings Banks
Underpricing bp 1.66 1.90 0.10 -5.75 9.25 352
Relative underpricing bp -0.01 1.09 0.06 -7.71 3.46 352
Discount bp 3.32 2.81 0.15 -5.50 17.50 366
Relative discount bp -0.09 1.76 0.09 -8.14 12.10 366
Stopout deviation bp 1.73 1.28 0.07 0.00 11.00 366
Award ratio % 57.41 23.62 1.23 0.00 100.00 366
Demand to reserve req % 285.41 228.18 11.93 21.38 1503.59 366
Award to total award % 0.09 0.17 0.01 0.00 1.97 366
Bidding frequency % 44.43 32.47 1.70 1.28 100.00 366
Number of bids 2.29 0.88 0.05 1.00 5.13 366
Panel (c): Cooperatives
Underpricing bp 0.78 2.55 0.15 -14.00 8.25 308
Relative underpricing bp -0.87 1.80 0.10 -14.13 3.88 308
Discount bp 3.47 4.09 0.23 -14.00 31.25 324
Relative discount bp -0.18 2.91 0.16 -14.24 21.37 324
Stopout deviation bp 2.80 2.20 0.12 0.00 21.00 324
Award ratio % 58.97 26.29 1.46 0.00 100.00 324
Demand to reserve req % 249.83 280.80 15.60 13.26 3062.99 324
Award to total award % 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.77 324
Bidding frequency % 27.51 25.41 1.41 1.28 100.00 324
Number of bids 2.05 1.09 0.06 1.00 9.00 324
38Table 3: (cont.)
units mean std s.e. min max N
Panel (d): Foreign Banks
Underpricing bp 0.69 1.94 0.44 -4.75 3.29 19
Relative underpricing bp -0.18 1.42 0.33 -5.71 1.02 19
Discount bp 2.84 4.24 0.93 -4.75 13.25 21
Relative discount bp -0.15 2.35 0.51 -7.45 4.64 21
Stopout deviation bp 1.94 1.57 0.34 0.40 7.00 21
Award ratio % 58.34 28.36 6.19 0.00 100.00 21
Demand to reserve req % 939.11 1218.19 272.40 73.36 4721.26 20
Award to total award % 0.17 0.32 0.07 0.00 1.15 21
Bidding frequency % 34.68 27.90 6.09 1.28 97.44 21
Number of bids 1.87 0.84 0.18 1.00 4.22 21
Panel (e): Landesbanks
Underpricing bp 1.48 1.14 0.33 -0.54 3.87 12
Relative underpricing bp 0.53 0.36 0.10 0.02 1.19 12
Discount bp 2.83 1.31 0.38 1.21 5.61 12
Relative discount bp 0.50 0.77 0.22 -0.51 2.31 12
Stopout deviation bp 1.04 0.22 0.06 0.70 1.46 12
Award ratio % 48.54 14.42 4.16 27.15 73.42 12
Demand to reserve req % 520.64 342.03 98.74 190.36 1087.91 12
Award to total award % 1.68 1.39 0.40 0.24 4.58 12
Bidding frequency % 80.45 19.41 5.60 29.49 100.00 12
Number of bids 2.42 0.40 0.12 1.84 3.15 12
Panel (f): Cooperative Central Banks
Underpricing bp 2.82 1.60 0.80 1.53 5.16 4
Relative underpricing bp 0.51 0.57 0.29 -0.15 1.24 4
Discount bp 4.27 2.23 1.12 2.38 7.50 4
Relative discount bp 0.45 0.61 0.30 -0.11 1.28 4
Stopout deviation bp 1.17 0.31 0.15 0.83 1.55 4
Award ratio % 42.34 16.93 8.46 18.34 56.57 4
Demand to reserve req % 1221.95 1181.01 590.51 205.75 2711.00 4
Award to total award % 1.45 0.90 0.45 0.53 2.64 4
Bidding frequency % 49.36 31.97 15.98 3.85 75.64 4
Number of bids 3.51 1.49 0.74 2.43 5.67 4
39Table 4: Liquidity Status by Assets
Banks are divided into 12 size groups by assets. The liquidity variables are deﬁned in Section 3.1. We calculate means of
each variable for each bank across all operations. We then report the mean across banks within each group. Speciﬁcally,
for each size group, means of each variable are calculated ﬁrst for each auction. The reported statistics are then calculated
across auctions for each size group. This corrects for censoring bias (due to changing composition of bidders over time).
Landesbanks and cooperative central banks are excluded.
Asset value percentiles
Units 0-5 6-10 11-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-90 91-95 96 97 98 99
Panel (a): Bidders (bid at least once)
Assets mill 71.22 130.60 222.60 434.42 864.10 1,649.05 3,545.54 6,907.01 11,569.87 16,515.70 23,995.47 105,928.50
Reserve req (daily) mill 0.80 1.52 2.57 4.92 9.74 18.40 36.85 58.60 74.92 106.75 96.82 650.81
Fulﬁllment % 111.61 102.70 110.86 104.05 102.31 101.84 102.57 101.56 96.65 97.29 95.91 94.00
Holding mill 0.81 1.54 2.58 4.96 9.75 18.49 37.66 58.99 76.80 112.73 101.53 626.41
Remn res req (daily) mill 0.66 1.39 2.33 4.49 9.05 17.13 34.37 56.02 75.18 97.86 102.85 681.74
Gross excess res mill 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.47 0.70 1.36 3.28 2.97 1.61 14.87 -1.32 -54.76
Normalized % 39.00 10.55 21.65 11.75 7.43 7.28 9.03 8.45 12.18 3.89 9.50 -8.11
Maturing repo mill 0.39 0.67 1.12 2.46 7.45 13.60 38.85 102.27 78.65 73.25 86.60 926.53
Norm Net excess res % -14.70 -33.96 -40.29 -66.45 -66.39 -75.16 -116.78 -225.22 -82.20 -247.68 -135.94 -372.45
Panel (b): Non-Bidders (never bid)
Assets mill 25.14 39.85 60.19 102.94 184.16 328.14 609.59 1,018.87 1,401.83 1,763.59 2,188.70 6,849.52
Reserve req (daily) mill 0.23 0.42 0.69 1.24 2.33 3.91 7.05 11.99 15.10 18.29 23.16 36.83
Fulﬁllment % 127.50 124.71 155.51 119.18 103.09 115.79 110.90 102.84 104.10 126.36 103.58 100.43
Holding mill 0.27 0.45 0.76 1.34 2.37 3.98 7.08 12.23 15.37 19.22 23.99 39.23
Remn res req (daily) mill 0.14 0.33 0.52 1.00 2.13 3.55 6.55 11.38 13.83 17.29 20.99 34.93
Gross excess res mill 0.12 0.11 0.24 0.33 0.23 0.42 0.52 0.84 1.54 1.93 3.00 4.29
Normalized % 98.29 107.89 153.28 76.88 13.22 103.46 32.61 11.37 13.42 77.80 13.85 21.77
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0Table 5: Price and Bidding Statistics by Assets
Banks are divided into 12 size groups by assets. The variables are deﬁned in the itemized list in Section 3.3. We calculate means
of each variable for each bank across all operations. We then report the mean across banks within each group. Speciﬁcally, for
each size group, means of each variable are calculated ﬁrst for each auction. The reported statistics are then calculated across
auctions for each size group. This corrects for censoring bias (due to changing composition of bidders over time). Landesbanks
and cooperative central banks are excluded.
Asset value percentiles
Units 0-5 6-10 11-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-90 91-95 96 97 98 99
Bidders (bid at least once)
Underpricing bp -1.33 -0.39 -0.17 0.17 0.31 0.55 0.72 0.67 1.00 1.35 0.80 0.76
Relative underpricing bp -1.88 -0.94 -0.76 -0.41 -0.27 -0.03 0.13 0.08 0.43 0.46 0.32 0.18
Discount bp 0.78 1.12 1.35 1.25 1.37 1.54 1.50 1.47 2.16 2.23 2.07 1.59
Relative discount bp -0.95 -0.61 -0.37 -0.47 -0.35 -0.18 -0.23 -0.26 0.42 0.35 0.39 -0.12
Stopout deviation bp 2.78 2.22 1.88 1.64 1.47 1.23 1.08 1.14 1.03 0.98 1.09 1.09
Award ratio % 65.36 69.23 64.47 69.14 66.69 63.02 64.79 64.32 52.24 52.40 53.60 63.78
Demand to reserve req % 447.41 287.05 363.37 377.17 303.22 303.56 326.96 850.82 651.73 1,047.59 482.51 833.34
Award to total award % 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.20 0.54 0.38 0.34 0.57 3.87
Bidding frequency 20.36 22.49 24.34 31.16 38.40 42.87 59.25 52.62 56.57 44.71 42.82 68.04
Number of bids 1.65 1.83 1.99 2.13 2.14 2.39 2.24 2.35 2.36 2.13 2.05 2.19
GROUP
Number bidders 39.96 39.73 75.38 155.70 158.15 158.67 78.67 38.89 8.00 8.00 7.78 15.73
Fraction winners % 94.23 95.46 93.87 94.47 92.93 92.03 90.45 92.21 86.37 88.94 87.13 89.71
Std of discount bp 3.63 2.64 2.58 2.03 1.88 1.68 1.29 1.44 1.47 1.37 1.44 1.41
Award to total award % 0.07 0.09 0.27 1.18 3.46 6.08 8.96 10.29 1.66 1.36 1.71 38.26
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1Table 6: Cross-Sectional Regressions
Each column represents a separate regression. Standard errors (in brackets) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity by using
the Huber/White estimate of variance. a, b, c denote signiﬁcance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Underpricing Relative Discount Relative Stopout Award Demand
Underpricing Discount Deviation Ratio to Res. Req.
units bp bp bp bp bp % %
Constant -0.325 -1.647a 4.242a 0.697 4.352a 54.193a 416.374b
(-0.51) (-4.12) (4.69) (1.06) (10.68) (7.63) (2.39)
ln(assets) ln(mill) 0.201a 0.199a -0.091 -0.052 -0.301a -0.363 -2.099
(2.91) (4.44) (-0.91) (-0.71) (-6.41) (-0.48) (-0.09)
norm net excess reserves % 4.7E-04 -1.8E-04 0.002a 0.001 0.001a -0.015b -2.051a
(1.39) (-1.19) (2.65) (1.60) (3.21) (-2.45) (-4.93)
Savings Bank 0.571b 0.175 -0.114 -0.374c -0.381a 4.590 -283.035a
(2.38) (1.44) (-0.39) (-1.76) (-2.97) (1.55) (-3.45)
Cooperative Bank -0.065 -0.404b -0.176 -0.555c 0.244 6.422c -219.655a
(-0.21) (-2.30) (-0.43) (-1.86) (1.30) (1.80) (-2.61)
Foreign Bank -0.288 0.028 -0.390 -0.382 -0.139 3.503 83.194
(-0.61) (0.11) (-0.4) (-0.72) (-0.48) (0.54) (0.35)
Landesbank -0.353 -0.093 0.003 0.494 0.258 -4.899 -317.452c
(-0.90) (-0.53) (0.01) (1.49) (1.42) (-1.00) (-1.81)
Coop Central Bank 1.111 -0.032 1.484 0.445 0.284 -11.962 290.884
(1.45) (-0.10) (1.49) (1.35) (0.92) (-1.62) (0.56)
R2 0.051 0.116 0.020 0.007 0.152 0.026 0.551
N 784 784 820 820 820 820 818
4
2Table 7: Market Condition and Interaction Variables
Descriptive statistics of explanatory market condition and interaction variables. Imbalance is
the standard deviation of the normalized net excess reserves of all banks before a given auc-
tion. Imbalance×nex and imbalance×ln(assets) are interaction variables for which imbalance
is multiplied by the normalized net excess reserves and log of assets, respectively, for each
bidder in a given auction. (Note: nex denotes normalized net excess reserves.) Size ratio is
the ratio of the expected auction size in auction t and the realized auction size in auction t-2.
Expected auction size is the liquidity neutral amount, which is computed from the liquidity
ﬁgures announced by the ECB the afternoon on the day prior to the auctions. Swap spread
is the diﬀerence between the two week swap rate and the minimum bid rate at 9:15 a.m./
on the auction day. Volatility of swap rate is the conditional volatility of the two week swap
rate on auction days (see Appendix 2).
Units mean median std s.e. min max N
imbalance % 1,144 400 3,331 382 86 26,997 76
imbalance×nex %×% -208,065 -42,118 2,770,774 18,022 -9.79E+07 3.67E+08 23,635
imbalance×ln(assets) %×ln(mill) 7,543 2,945 21,128 137 282 339,127 23,673
size ratio 100% 1.238 0.977 1.747 0.200 0.200 15.800 76
expected auction size bill 84.256 83.000 28.829 3.264 5 177 78
swap spread bp 5.913 4.250 8.658 0.980 -9.000 48.250 78
volatility of swap rate bp 5.322 5.776 1.332 0.151 0.194 9.304 78
43Table 8: Panel Regressions
Each column represents a separate regression. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered on each auction and adjusted
for heteroscedasticity by using the Huber/White estimate of variance. a, b, c denote signiﬁcance (two-tailed) at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively. Note: nex denotes normalized net excess reserves.
Underpricing Relative Discount Relative Stopout Award Demand to
Underpricing Discount Deviation Ratio to Res. Req.
units bp bp bp bp bp % %
Constant -1.816 -1.308a 0.480 -0.828 1.466a 38.526a 344.341a
(-1.56) (-4.74) (0.37) (-1.36) (2.75) (3.26) (7.08)
ln(assets) ln(mill.) 0.155a 0.166a 0.037 0.044 -0.188a -0.647c 10.513b
(8.13) (9.75) (0.9) (1.11) (-7.62) (-1.98) (2.02)
norm net excess reserves % -7.0E-05 7.4E-06 2.4E-04a 2.7E-04a 8.7E-05b -0.006a -1.085a
(-1.29) (0.24) (3.49) (4.61) (2.56) (-6.45) (-20.58)
imbalance % -1.2E-04a -4.9E-05a -1.7E-04a -1.0E-04a 3.7E-05 0.002b 0.017a
(-3.42) (-2.89) (-3.06) (-2.97) (1.61) (2.02) (3.78)
imbalance×nex %×% 1.3E-08b 5.3E-09a 3.5E-10 -4.3E-09 -8.1E-09a 8.6E-08 4.3E-05a
(2.51) (3.37) (0.07) (-1.37) (-3.96) (1.14) (10.55)
imbalance×ln(assets) %×ln(mill) 5.5E-06a 4.8E-06a 1.2E-05a 1.2E-05a -2.1E-06 -1.7E-04c -1.2E-03c
(2.70) (2.65) (3.12) (3.05) (-0.97) (-1.81) (-1.87)
size ratio 100% 0.097a -0.007 0.096a 0.013 -0.026b -0.684a 13.981a
(4.17) (-1.28) (3.14) (0.69) (-2.24) (-2.72) (6.9)
swap spread bp 0.146a 0.011 0.284a 0.031 0.079a -0.837b 5.515a
(2.76) (1.09) (4.16) (1.03) (13.6) (-2.00) (6.71)
neg. swap spread -2.976a -0.072 -2.964a 0.187 0.199 24.560a -82.293a
(-4.76) (-0.75) (-4.23) (0.73) (1.34) (4.44) (-5.23)
volatility bp -0.347c 0.004 -0.291 0.029 0.070 -0.970 8.674c
(-1.90) (0.16) (-1.51) (0.47) (1.18) (-0.66) (1.95)
exp.auction size bill 0.030a -0.001 0.018b 0.003 0.006c 0.346a -0.862a
(3.66) (-0.5) (2.01) (0.84) (1.71) (4.07) (-3.07)
Savings Bank 0.072 0.012 -0.402a -0.439a -0.221a 8.471a -329.932a
(1.16) (0.22) (-3.75) (-4.22) (-2.87) (8.07) (-12.41)
Cooperative -0.359a -0.427a -0.419a -0.452a 0.165a 5.888a -310.139a
(-5.58) (-8.48) (-4.39) (-5.4) (3.16) (4.93) (-11.61)
Foreign Bank 0.141 0.172c -0.310c -0.312b -0.254a 6.385a 29.021
(1.1) (1.83) (-1.95) (-2.19) (-2.67) (3.54) (0.59)
Landesbank -0.001 -0.098c 0.147 0.172 0.237a -4.442a -251.399a
(-0.01) (-1.70) (0.99) (1.13) (3.78) (-3.16) (-7.24)
Coop Central Bank -0.031 -0.206b 0.114 -0.070 0.217b -4.437 -208.594a
(-0.2) (-2.12) (0.62) (-0.42) (2.43) (-1.57) (-3.47)
R2 0.5295 0.0547 0.5203 0.0203 0.1937 0.1602 0.4146
N 19,217 19,217 23,635 23,635 23,635 23,635 23,635
4
4Table 9: Heckman Sample Selection Regressions
Each column represents a separate regression. Standard errors are clustered on each auction and adjusted for het-
eroscedasticity by using the Huber/White estimate of variance. t-statistics are in brackets. a, b, c denote signiﬁcance
(two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Note: nex denotes normalized net excess reserves. The selection
equation (Panel b) is run on the full sample of bidding and non-bidding banks.
Panel a: Bidding Underpricing Relative Discount Relative Stopout Award Demand to
and Performance Underpricing Discount Deviation Ratio to Res. Req.
units bp bp bp bp bp % %
Constant -1.664 -1.497a -0.088 -1.586b 1.220b 55.194a -870.190b
(-1.37) (-5.16) (-0.06) (-2.53) (2.29) (4.34) (-2.07)
ln(assets) ln(mill.) 0.144a 0.179a 0.078 0.101b -0.169a -1.883a 100.089a
(5.78) (10.23) (1.59) (2.38) (-7.13) (-4.86) (3.01)
norm net excess reserves % -4.1E-05 -2.6E-05 1.4E-04b 1.4E-04a 4.5E-05c -0.003a -1.268a
(-1.02) (-0.97) (2.42) (2.93) (1.75) (-4.14) (-13.75)
imbalance % -1.2E-04a -4.8E-05a -1.7E-04a -9.5E-05a 3.9E-05c 0.001c 0.023a
(-3.43) (-2.84) (-3.00) (-2.85) (1.69) (1.87) (3.93)
imbalance×nex %×% 1.2E-08b 6.2E-09a 2.5E-09 -1.4E-09 -7.1E-09a 2.0E-08 4.7E-05a
(2.45) (4.16) (0.54) (-0.5) (-3.72) (0.32) (8.66)
imbalance×ln(assets) %×ln(mill) 5.6E-06a 4.7E-06a 1.2E-05a 1.1E-05a -2.3E-06 -1.5E-04c -0.002b
(2.72) (2.61) (3.02) (2.94) (-1.07) (-1.65) (-2.23)
size ratio 100% 0.099a -0.010c 0.089a 0.003 -0.029b -0.471c -0.108
(4.29) (-1.75) (3.03) (0.16) (-2.43) (-1.95) (-0.03)
swap spread bp 0.147a 0.011 0.284a 0.031 0.079a -0.830c 5.524a
(2.79) (1.03) (4.11) (0.98) (13.49) (-1.88) (2.71)
neg. swap spread -2.970a -0.080 -2.987a 0.157 0.189 25.251a -121.859a
(-4.77) (-0.82) (-4.23) (0.59) (1.28) (4.46) (-3.57)
volatility bp -0.346c 0.002 -0.299 0.019 0.067 -0.749 -5.766
(-1.89) (0.08) (-1.54) (0.3) (1.14) (-0.5) (-0.87)
exp.auction size bill 0.030a -4.9E-04 0.018a 0.004 0.006c 0.331a 0.209
(3.66) (-0.34) (2.07) (1.05) (1.78) (3.85) (0.43)
Savings Bank 0.046 0.043 -0.314a -0.322a -0.183b 5.906a -132.172b
(0.77) (0.83) (-2.73) (-3.06) (-2.44) (5.33) (-2.12)
Cooperative -0.360a -0.426a -0.422a -0.456a 0.164a 5.954a -301.231a
(-5.62) (-8.45) (-4.37) (-5.36) (3.12) (4.91) (-11.65)
Foreign Bank 0.153 0.158c -0.353a -0.369a -0.273a 7.645a -54.405
(1.19) (1.69) (-2.24) (-2.60) (-2.84) (4.22) (-1.06)
Landesbank -0.003 -0.095c 0.155 0.184 0.241a -4.695a -212.904a
(-0.05) (-1.65) (1.07) (1.22) (3.87) (-3.28) (-6.58)
Coop Central Bank -0.025 -0.214b 0.089 -0.103 0.206b -3.707 -238.179a
(-0.16) (-2.23) (0.48) (-0.62) (2.29) (-1.32) (-3.77)
N uncensored 19,217 19,217 23,635 23,635 23,635 23,635 23,635
4
5Panel b: Selection
Underpricing Relative Discount Relative Stopout Award Demand to
Underpricing Discount Deviation Ratio to Res. Req.
units bp bp bp bp bp % %
Constant -3.755a -3.753a -3.522a -3.525a -3.522a -3.523a -3.443a
(-29.40) (-29.18) (-31.88) (-31.43) (-32.10) (-31.56) (-39.95)
ln(assets) ln(mill.) 0.238a 0.237a 0.259a 0.259a 0.260a 0.258a 0.274a
(23.94) (23.87) (26.95) (26.72) (27.11) (26.91) (20.12)
norm net excess reserves % -1.5E-04 -1.5E-04 -1.5E-04 -1.5E-04 -1.5E-04 -1.5E-04 -3.4E-04
(-1.41) (-1.41) (-1.4) (-1.4) (-1.4) (-1.4) (-1.59)
imbalance % 1.3E-05c 1.3E-05c 1.4E-05 1.4E-05 1.3E-05 1.3E-05 1.3E-05c
(1.95) (1.94) (1.52) (1.52) (1.49) (1.55) (1.89)
imbalance×nex %×% 3.1E-09 3.1E-09 2.9E-09 2.9E-09 2.8E-09 3.1E-09 1.2E-08
(0.81) (0.81) (0.78) (0.77) (0.77) (0.83) (1.3)
imbalance×ln(assets) %×ln(mill) -3.0E-07 -3.0E-07 -8.7E-07 -8.6E-07 -8.5E-07 -8.6E-07 -8.0E-07
(-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.76) (-0.75) (-0.74) (-0.77) (-0.92)
size ratio 100% 0.019a 0.019a 0.020a 0.020a 0.020a 0.020a 0.016a
(6.36) (6.40) (7.08) (7.11) (7.03) (7.08) (3.82)
swap spread bp 0.009a 0.009a 0.016a 0.016a 0.016a 0.016a 0.016a
(2.72) (2.78) (7.03) (7.11) (7.05) (7.16) (6.68)
neg. swap spread -0.109c -0.108c -0.231a -0.229a -0.234a -0.225a -0.221a
(-1.86) (-1.84) (-4.12) (-4.10) (-4.19) (-4.05) (-4.34)
volatility bp 0.025c 0.025c 0.026b 0.026b 0.025b 0.027b 0.019b
(1.92) (1.92) (2.23) (2.25) (2.25) (2.28) (1.97)
exp.auction size bill 0.002a 0.002a -1.4E-04 -9.7E-05 -1.4E-04 -9.6E-05 -4.8E-05
(2.84) (2.83) (-0.18) (-0.12) (-0.18) (-0.12) (-0.07)
Savings Bank 0.218a 0.219a 0.180a 0.180a 0.179a 0.180a 0.156a
(7.30) (7.31) (7.17) (7.14) (7.09) (7.12) (6.27)
Cooperative -0.078a -0.078a -0.101a -0.101a -0.101a -0.101a -0.134a
(-2.69) (-2.69) (-4.00) (-4.00) (-3.98) (-3.98) (-5.93)
Foreign Bank -0.172a -0.172a -0.247a -0.247a -0.247a -0.246a -0.269a
(-4.83) (-4.82) (-7.26) (-7.23) (-7.25) (-7.18) (-8.04)
Landesbank 0.103 0.104 0.199b 0.196b 0.199b 0.184b 0.062
(1.26) (1.27) (2.46) (2.44) (2.45) (2.31) (0.71)
Coop Central Bank -0.155 -0.154 -0.071 -0.072 -0.072 -0.080 -0.166
(-1.11) (-1.1) (-0.54) (-0.56) (-0.56) (-0.62) (-1.41)
Maturing repo 2.413a 2.413a 2.338a 2.337a 2.336a 2.336a 1.853a
(51.43) (51.28) (53.40) (53.27) (53.69) (52.55) (5.68)
Last auction 2.427a 2.479a 1.798b 1.932b 1.716b 1.983a 1.413b
(2.90) (2.95) (2.25) (2.44) (2.20) (2.69) (2.10)
N 168,160 168,160 172,578 172,578 172,578 172,578 172,578
4
6Panel c: Parameters. Standard errors are in italics and smaller font. b denotes signiﬁcance (two-tailed) at the 5% level.
Underpricing Relative Discount Relative Stopout Award Demand to
Underpricing Discount Deviation Ratio to Res. Req.
Log pseudolikelihood -70339 -64326 -94179 -90589 -79862 -151272 -221398
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
rho -0.031 0.052b 0.085b 0.131b 0.068b -0.219b 0.714b
0.038 0.021 0.037 0.029 0.022 0.030 0.139
sigma 2.346b 1.717b 3.229b 2.782b 1.760b 36.526b 728.681b
0.138 0.139 0.321 0.302 0.155 0.957 68.318
lambda -0.072 0.090b 0.274b 0.366b 0.119b -8.007b 520.110b
0.090 0.037 0.108 0.065 0.042 1.092 133.097
4
7Appendix 2: Volatility of Swap Rate
To estimate the conditional volatility of the two week swap rate, we apply a modiﬁed
GARCH(1,1) model (Bollerslev, 1986) to daily rate changes. We have considered various
calendar eﬀects, as in Hamilton (1996), but not all are in the ﬁnal speciﬁcation. Our model
is based on that in Nyborg et al (2002). However, our ﬁnal speciﬁcation has a somewhat
better ﬁt in the period we are studying as compared to their’s.
Table 10: Conditional Volatility of Swap Rate
This table reports the results of the conditional volatility estimation of the two-week
swap rate, using a modiﬁed GARCH(1,1) model. Panel (a) gives the coeﬃcients of
the mean equation, while panel (b) gives the coeﬃcients of the variance equation.
Slope is the diﬀerence between 12 and 1 month Euribor. (-1) stands for the preceding
day’s observation Downswap takes the value 1 if the swap rate fell the previous day
and 0 otherwise. ECBMEET(-1) is 1 if there was a meeting of the ECB Governing
Council the previous day. Underbid(-1) is 1 if there was an underbid auction. (An
auction is underbid if total demand is less than the liquidity neutral amount. For this
purpose, total demand is the demand of all, not only German, bidders. See Nyborg
et al (2002) for a discussion of underbid auctions.) Endmonth takes the value 1 if
the day is the last business day of a month and 0 otherwise, Endres takes the value
1 if the day is the last business day of a reserve maintenance period and 0 otherwise.
Endres(-1) is a dummy variable for the ﬁrst business day in a maintenance period.
Mainrepo takes the value 1 if the day is an auction day (main reﬁnancing operation)
and 0 otherwise.
Coeﬃcient z-statistics
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